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For decades, clinical psychologists have catalogued cultural group differences in symptom
presentation, assessment, and treatment outcomes. We know that ‘culture matters’ in mental
health – but do we know how it matters, or why? Answers may be found in an integration of
cultural and clinical psychology. Cultural psychology demands a move beyond description to
explanation of group variation. For its part, clinical psychology insists on the importance of
individual people, while also extending the range of human variation. Cultural–clinical psy-
chology integrates these approaches, opening up new lines of inquiry. The central assumption
of this interdisciplinary field is that culture, mind, and brain constitute one another as a multi-
level dynamic system in which no level is primary, and that psychopathology is an emergent
property of that system. We illustrate cultural–clinical psychology research using our work on
depression in Chinese populations and conclude with a call for greater collaboration among
researchers in this field.
Horace Cho 1 is a 57-year-old businessman from Hong
Kong who has resided in Vancouver for fifteen years, re-
ferred for insomnia, fatigue, loss of appetite, gastrointesti-
nal distress, and depressed mood. Mr. Cho was raised in
Hong Kong, completed his MBA in California, and moved
to Vancouver to join his wife’s family and start a new busi-
ness. Despite Mr. Cho’s excellent English and knowledge of
North American practices, his business is in difficulty. He at-
tributes business troubles to the effects of his physical symp-
toms, rather than seeing these symptoms as resulting from
psychosocial stress.
Mr. Cho lives in a majority Chinese suburb and encour-
ages his children to stay close to Chinese traditions; however,
his daughters desire greater participation in North American
society. He describes his wife as much more traditional than
he is, but to his surprise it is she who encourages the children
to participate in mainstream society. At the initial interview,
Mr. Cho denies depressed mood but agrees that symptoms,
business difficulties, and values conflicts in his family are
‘upsetting sometimes’.
What is Mr. Cho’s ‘culture’, and is it the same as his
wife’s? Does he have a mental health problem and, if so,
what is it? In what ways does culture shape the experience,
expression, and communication of his distress? Where can
psychologists look for ways to think about such questions?
Over the past few decades, scholars from several disci-
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plines have examined the interrelation of culture and mental
health. Many more have taken on cross-cultural comparisons
in mainstream psychology. That ‘culture matters’ in clinical
psychology is nothing new, although it bears frequent repeti-
tion in an era of biological reductionism. Rather, our claim is
threefold: first, that there is relatively little cultural research
in clinical psychology that aspires to explanation, to telling a
culturally-framed story about what is observed; second, that
the means for achieving this can be found in greater integra-
tion of cultural and clinical psychology, to the benefit of both;
and third, that the result is a new field. Cultural–clinical psy-
chology has in some sense been around for a while, pursued
by a small number of researchers. Nonetheless, it has not yet
coalesced as an established field of study or as an approach
to culture and mental health research. This paper aims to
promote these ends.
We start by locating ourselves with respect to ‘cultural
psychology’ and ‘clinical psychology’, and then present
some first steps toward a cultural–clinical psychology. Cen-
tral to this integration is the idea of mutual constitution – that
culture, mind, and brain form a single system in which no
level can be understood without the others. We then draw on
our own research, pertaining to depression in Chinese pop-
ulations, to provide some empirical examples. We conclude
with a brief critique of these studies, considering ways in
which they could be improved and interpreted in light of cul-
tural–clinical psychology. Concrete suggestions to improve
cultural–clinical psychology research are summarized in the
Appendix and referenced throughout.
1Horace Cho is based on a composite of two cases. Identifying
information has been fictionalized.
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Cultural–Clinical Psychology: A Brief Introduction
Cultural Psychology
In positioning cultural–clinical psychology, we begin by
grounding the first term in the ‘cultural psychology’ perspec-
tive (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Shweder, 1990). The
word ‘culture’ has long been used in psychology to stand for
ethnicity or nationality, and invoked as a black-box explana-
tion: groups differ because of ‘culture’, but the specific ways
in which this happens remain unclear. Cultural psychol-
ogy represents a move away from cataloguing differences
to understanding culture and how it shapes psychological
variation (e.g., Betancourt & López, 1993; Cohen, Nisbett,
Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996; Heine & Norenzayan, 2006; Ki-
tayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997). Dif-
ferentiating between culture and ‘cultural group’ emphasizes
that individual group members can partially adhere to or re-
ject aspects of culture. For example, Mr. Cho and his wife
have different views about the acculturation of their children,
and not in ways that are obviously predictable from their own
degree of traditionalism (Appendix: 1.1).
Is culture best understood as ‘in the head’ or ‘in the
world’? These views are held in tension and they sometimes
conflict but, as with cognition and behavior in clinical psy-
chology, neither is sufficient alone. People do not simply
carry out behaviors. Rather, they perform ‘acts of mean-
ing’ (Bruner, 1990), intended by the actor and understood
by observers as meaningful. These acts are framed by the
cultural meaning system and their enactment contributes to
shaping this system (Kashima, 2000). Nisbett and Cohen
(1996), for example, conducted an important series of stud-
ies on the ‘Culture of Honor’ in the American South, report-
ing that southerners have more favorable attitudes towards
violence in cases where honor is at stake. Moreover, they
demonstrated experimentally that southerners whose honor
has been challenged are more physiologically reactive and
take longer to step out the way of a confederate walking to-
ward them in a narrow corridor. Cultural variation is cap-
tured here by both opinions and behaviors, and the behaviors
of both participant and confederate are understood as mean-
ingful.
The idea of cultural scripts can bridge these perspectives,
as they both reflect meaning structures in the head and guide
behavioral practices in the world (DiMaggio, 1997). Scripts
refer to organized units of knowledge that encode and propa-
gate meanings and practices. They serve as mechanisms that
allow for rapid automatic retrieval and use of information
acquired from the world while shaping how that information
is perceived. Enacted as behavior, scripts are observable to
others and become part of the cultural context, shaping as-
sumptions about what others think and expectancies about
how they will behave (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteyn-
berg, & Wan, 2010). Moreover, people can access multiple
cultural scripts, primed by different contextual cues (Hong &
Chiu, 2001). If while at home Mr. Cho scolds his children
for pursuing a ‘Western lifestyle’, he is accessing available
scripts for cultural preservation while his actions and oth-
ers’ responses contribute to shaping these scripts, and pass-
ing them to his children. In work contexts, these same scripts
may be primed rarely if at all. Mr. Cho’s wife can understand
him according to their shared meaning system even as she
accesses a different available cultural script – promoting her
children’s well-being by ensuring they can function in a new
society (Appendix: 2.2).
Clinical Psychology
In using the term ‘clinical’ in cultural–clinical psychol-
ogy, we are thinking primarily of researchers trained as sci-
entists or scientist-practitioners in clinical psychology, health
psychology, or experimental psychopathology. Although not
all of these researchers are directly engaged with both sci-
ence and practice, there is an emphasis on moving between
theory and research about groups on the one hand, and the
experiences and needs of individual sufferers on the other.
Clinical psychology is concerned both with describing patho-
logical phenomena and with using psychological principles
to intervene with these phenomena therapeutically.
As a health discipline, clinical psychology inevitably dis-
cusses ‘symptoms’ and ‘syndromes’ – specific pathological
experiences and the ways in which they are grouped. Mr.
Cho’s reported symptoms are insomnia, fatigue, loss of ap-
petite, and gastrointestinal distress, with some evidence of
depressed mood. A clinician trained in DSM-IV has over
300 syndromes to consider, but would most likely consider
Major Depressive Disorder (MDD). Clinical psychology has
long had a certain willingness to critique diagnostic sys-
tems accompanied by a preference for evidence-based symp-
tom dimensions (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1983; Krueger &
Markon, 2006). This openness benefits cultural studies of
psychopathology, as diagnostic systems are themselves cul-
tural products (Gone & Kirmayer, 2010; Lewis-Fernández &
Kleinman, 1994). Moreover, Kleinman (1988) argues that
rigid application of a diagnostic system conceals cultural
variation. He has shown how The International Pilot Study of
Schizophrenia reliably identified patients meeting diagnostic
criteria for schizophrenia, but in doing so eliminated a large
proportion of psychotic patients at each site – precisely those
patients who showed the most variability across the cultural
groups (Appendix: 1.2).
Cultural-Clinical Psychology: What’s New?
In an era both of fragmentation and interdisciplinarity in
psychology (Cacioppo, 2007) it is easy to argue that two ar-
eas can benefit from collaboration on topics of shared con-
cern. We wish to make a stronger claim in this case: a new
field emerges at their intersection. For this to be plausible, we
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must first establish that clinical psychology is altered by con-
sideration of cultural questions. More challenging, we must
also establish that cultural psychology is altered by clinical
questions, not simply given new content. Research in cul-
tural–clinical psychology should tell us something new about
the cultural contexts under study, not just the pathologies. Fi-
nally, we must demonstrate that new questions and methods
for addressing them emerge from this sub-discipline, or at
least that the potential is there (Appendix 2.1).
Clinical Psychology Encounters Cultural Psychology
A central issue for clinical psychology – what is disor-
der? – cannot be fully understood without considering deep
cultural influence. The oft-used distinction between illness
and disease defines illness as the socially-situated experi-
ence of having a particular disorder and disease as the cor-
responding malfunction in biological or psychological pro-
cesses (Boorse, 1975; Kleinman, 1977). Wakefield (1992)
similarly defines disorder as harmful dysfunction, in which
harm indicates that the disorder is problematic in a given
cultural context and dysfunction indicates the failure of a bi-
ological system evolutionarily adapted for particular ends.
While these approaches ostensibly give equal credit to
culture and biology, uncritical acceptance plays into biases
of mainstream clinical psychology. Researchers can end up
exemplifying Geertz’s (1984, p. 269) characterization of
the behavioral sciences, in which, “culture is icing, biology,
cake... difference is shallow, likeness, deep”. We prefer to
see disorder as both biological and cultural, in a fundamen-
tally inseparable way. Depressed mood has many biological
and cultural constituents worthy of focused study for spe-
cific purposes, but there is no depressed mood until these
constituents come together and are experienced by someone.
Methodologically, clinical research has much to gain from
incorporating the cultural psychology perspective. Integra-
tion of findings on the cultural shaping of psychological
functioning can allow clinical psychologists to develop a
broader and more nuanced view of normal human experi-
ence. Cultural psychology is well positioned to help clinical
psychology move beyond conceptualizations of mental ill-
nesses as products of solitary minds to thinking of it as con-
textually embedded in networks of local meanings, norms,
institutions, and cultural products (e.g., Adams, Salter, Pick-
ett, Kurtis, & Phillips, 2010). Finally, cultural psychology
can inform our understanding of the ways in which peo-
ple, including both patients and clinicians, incorporate con-
textual information in detecting, reporting and interpreting
symptoms of mental illness (for examples of these cultural
psychology ideas, not yet adapted for clinical questions, see
Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Hong, Morris,
Chiu, & Benet-Martínez, 2000; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001;
Uchida, Norasakkunkit, & Kitayama, 2004). In Mr. Cho’s
case, the institutional demands of a mental health clinic may
have tilted the emphasis toward symptoms and attributions
and away from the understandable suffering caused by busi-
ness and family difficulties (Appendix: 2.3).
The idea of scripts can help us think about specific ways in
which mental health is shaped by cultural context. Although
by definition abnormality violates expectations of what is
normal, people nonetheless have scripts to help them make
sense of pathology as best they can. Confusing and frighten-
ing experiences, such as emerging psychopathology, have a
particularly strong need for scripts (Philippot & Rimé, 1997;
Taylor, 1983). The large but finite number of ways to be
physically or psychologically distressed is further molded
by cultural-historical context, so that specific disorders draw
upon a pool of available symptoms (Shorter, 1992). Cultural
scripts can then be seen as mapping the sufferer’s experience
to what is available in this ‘symptom pool’, focusing on and
thereby amplifying those symptoms that best serve explana-
tory and communicative purposes. Denial of depressed mood
and acknowledgement that his problems are upsetting can be
seen as serving Mr. Cho’s communication goals in a particu-
lar health care setting.
Cultural Psychology Encounters Clinical Psychology
Beyond providing new content, potential contributions of
clinical psychology begin with two of cultural psychology’s
core concerns: heterogeneity of cultural groups and lim-
ited coherence of cultural contexts (Kashima, 2000). These
concerns do not necessarily require clinical psychology, but
the study of mental disorder serves as an engine to gener-
ate many examples of each. Psychopathological phenomena
also shed new light on culture; as with the lesion studies that
propelled neuroscience, we learn new things about cultural
processes when the normal cultural scripts no longer work
(for a similar idea, not specific to psychopathology, see Beck-
stead, Cabell, & Valsiner, 2009). North American studies of
social phobia patients highlight the central role fear of nega-
tive evaluation plays when healthy interpersonal functioning
breaks down (see Hofmann & Barlow, 2002). These find-
ings also reveal some of the assumptions of normal social
relationships in North America: one is to portray one’s true
self and have it be positively evaluated by others. Studies of
socially anxious patients in other cultural groups can serve
the same function, showing for example how fear of caus-
ing discomfort to others – perhaps by inappropriately reveal-
ing one’s true self – is a central concern for many socially
anxious people in East Asian contexts (Rector, Kocovski, &
Ryder, 2006; Sasaki & Tanno, 2005; Zhang, Yu, Draguns,
Zhang, & Tang, 2000).
Methodologically, clinical psychology has a rich tradition
of modeling ways in which abnormal behavior is shaped by
constraints imparted by physiological and environmental in-
fluences, and their interactions. For example, contemporary
research on depression spans multiple levels of analysis rang-
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ing from genes to hormones, brain anatomy and function,
attention, memory, emotional reactivity, personality, and in-
terpersonal functioning (Hammen, 2003; for a thorough re-
view, see chapters in Gotlib & Hammen, 2009). Clinical
psychology can also provide tools for theorizing about the
ways in which psychological processes become functional or
dysfunctional in a cultural context. For example, cultural in-
novation and propagation depends on specific abilities, such
as harnessing novel associations or conveying negative emo-
tions (Chentsova-Dutton & Heath, 2007), that are also asso-
ciated with predisposition to certain forms of psychopathol-
ogy.
Cultural-Clinical Psychology: Mutual Constitution of
Culture-Mind-Brain
The core claim of cultural psychology is not simply that
groups differ or ‘culture matters’, but rather that human cul-
ture and human psychology are each grounded in the other:
that culture and mind ‘make each other up’ (Shweder, 1991).
Clinical psychology research, in keeping with trends in psy-
chological science and in psychiatry, tends to focus more on
the interrelation of mind and brain (Andreasen, 1997; Bar-
rett, 2009; Ilardi & Feldman, 2001). We argue that the best
approach for cultural–clinical psychology emerges from the
joint concerns of the two fields, leading us to discuss mutual
constitution of culture, mind, and brain. This approach fol-
lows recent trends in cultural psychiatry (Kirmayer, 2012)
and cultural psychology (Chiao, 2009; Kitayama & Park,
2010; Kitayama & Uskul, 2011), in which culture, mind, and
brain are thought of as multiple levels of a single system, here
called the culture–mind–brain (Appendix 3.1).
Culture and Mind
The mutual constitution of culture and mind develops
through processes that are an integral part of socialization,
in that minds develop in cultural contexts that are themselves
composed of minds (Cole, 1996; Valsiner, 1989). We cannot
understand human minds unless we understand them in cul-
tural context, and we cannot understand human culture un-
less we understand minds. The goal is to find ways of think-
ing and studying the psychological and the cultural so that
neither is seen as the ultimate source of the other (Markus &
Hamedani, 2006; Shweder, 1995).
Mind and Brain
It is increasingly untenable to propose models of mental
health that have no room for the brain, as shaped by the
genome and in turn by evolutionary processes. While we
agree wholeheartedly with Geertz (1973) that, “it is culture
all the way down”, we also simultaneously make the oppo-
site claim: it is biology all the way up. Both must be true for
mutual constitution to have any meaning. Rather than seeing
mind as the subjective epiphenomenon of brain, however, we
prefer a view of mind as fundamentally social and tool-using,
even as extended beyond the brain (Clark & Chalmers, 1998;
Hutchins, 1995; Kirmayer, 2012; Vygotsky, 1978). Habit-
ually used tools and close others are partially incorporated
into one’s mind: the online calendar can become part of the
mind’s memory system; the close friend can become part of
the mind’s emotion regulation system.
Culture and Brain
It does not necessarily follow from a tripartite model of
culture, mind, and brain in this way that mind mediates all
culture-brain links. The human brain is adapted to acquire
culture and responds to cultural inputs with marked plastic-
ity, especially early in development (Wexler, 2006). Indeed,
the emergence of a recognizable human mind may require
these transactions between culture and brain. At the same
time, biology constrains culture. There are a large number
of possible ways in which culture can be configured, yet
the number of impossible configurations is practically infi-
nite (Gilbert, 2002; Mealey, 2005; öhman & Mineka, 2001).
That this is true does not compromise the equally important
observation that human possibilities are many, diverse, and
deeply shaped by culture (Marsella & Yamada, 2010; Tseng,
2006).
The Ecology of Culture-Mind-Brain
Describing the interrelations of culture, mind, and brain
as a triangle of linked associations might imply three inter-
related systems. We prefer to think of culture–mind–brain as
one dynamic multilevel system, an information network in-
stantiated in neuronal pathways, cognitive schemata, human
relationships, culturally-mediated tools, global telecommu-
nications, corporations, political actors, health care systems,
and so on. Cultures, minds, and brains cannot be understood
in isolation from one another. As yet, there is little research
that engages with all three levels simultaneously, although a
promising avenue has been opened by Kim, Sherman, Taylor,
et al. (2010a). These researchers showed that cultural context
and variations in certain serotonin receptor genes interact to
predict locus of attention. Specifically, one of the variants
predicts a tendency to attend to context in Korean partici-
pants, and the same variant predicts an especially strong ten-
dency to attend to the focal object in Euro-American partici-
pants.
Psychopathology is an emergent property of cul-
ture–mind–brain, with no ultimate cause at any one level.
While changes at one level affect all levels, it does not follow
that disorder at one level means disorder at other levels, let
alone that disorder at a higher level must be caused by disor-
der at a lower level. A disordered brain circuit does not re-
quire malfunctioning neurons, nor does a disordered neuron
require malfunctioning molecules, although neither makes
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sense in the absence of neurons or molecules. Pathology
can emerge from problematic feedback loops in which the
response to a problem exacerbates the problem, even when
all components of the loop are working normally (Hacking,
1995; Kirmayer, 2012). A conditioned fear that goes on to
cause problems in living is a disorder, it involves the brain,
but it does not require a disordered brain. Values conflict
between Mr. Cho and his wife can create a stressful environ-
ment for their children, but not because a lower-level disorder
leads them to adhere to pathological values.
Disorder at higher levels can also lead to disorder at lower
levels. Cultural norms, economic conditions, and politi-
cal response might interact to produce violent conflict, with
consequences that include damage to brains from traumatic
stress. It is incomplete at best to claim that psychological
consequences of that damage are caused by the brain with-
out acknowledging political or economic causes. Similarly,
Mr. Cho’s depression might make sense as psychosocial
stress coupled with preexisting vulnerability, but the depres-
sion has lasting consequences for the brain (Kendler, Thorn-
ton, & Gardner, 2000). A mind-level intervention such as
Cognitive-Behavior Therapy (CBT), moreover, impacts on
the brain (DeRubeis, Siegle, & Hollon, 2008) – unsurprising,
as culture–mind–brain is a single system (Appendix 3.2).
Before considering an example of three recent cul-
tural–clinical psychology lines of research focused on an in-
terrelated set of questions, let us briefly return to the case of
Mr. Cho.
After the initial assessment, Mr. Cho began a 16-week
course of CBT for depression. The case at first appeared
to be a textbook case of ‘Chinese somatization’; somatic
symptoms were discussed almost exclusively, unlinked to psy-
chosocial stressors. Sustained discussion of these stressors
would sometimes lead to marked tearfulness and inability
to maintain emotional composure. Once rapport was es-
tablished, depressed mood was acknowledged fairly quickly,
along with guilt and pessimism, primarily described as reac-
tions to how the physical symptoms had impacted his busi-
ness and family life.
Mr. Cho asked several times how CBT could help him
with his primary concern – the somatic symptoms – and as
treatment turned to depressed mood, guilt, and pessimism,
he began to miss sessions. We reframed treatment in line
with CBT approaches to Chronic Fatigue Syndrome – em-
phasizing holism of mind and body, talking more openly
about somatic symptoms, and incorporating some somatic
approaches such as sleep hygiene and diet regulation. Psy-
chological and physical causes, psychological and physical
symptoms, all became legitimate topics for discussion.
Cultural Psychology: Empirical Examples
We are each involved in independently developed lines of
research taking a cultural psychology approach to clinically-
relevant questions about Chinese-origin participants and de-
pression. To illustrate the potential of cultural–clinical psy-
chology, we turn to a more sustained discussion of this work.
Cultural Psychology Research on Depression
Somatic and Psychological Symptoms
In a now classic study, Kleinman (1982) argued that Chi-
nese psychiatric patients tend to emphasize somatic symp-
toms relative to ‘Western’ norms (see also Parker, Cheah, &
Roy, 2001). Ryder et al. (2008) used multiple assessment
methods with Han Chinese and Euro-Canadian psychiatric
outpatients. Results generally showed greater somatic symp-
tom reporting in the Chinese group and greater psychologi-
cal symptom reporting in the Euro-Canadian group. The ten-
dency to devalue the importance of one’s emotional life was
also higher in the Chinese group and mediated the relation
between cultural group and symptom presentation.
Devaluation of one’s emotional life does not fit well with
readily accessible cultural scripts in North America. This
tendency was measured using a tool designed to measure
pathology, the Externally-Oriented Thinking (EOT) subscale
of the Twenty-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20;
Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994). Whereas EOT might capture
pathological beliefs in a cultural context that fosters ideals of
healthy emotional expression, it may simply represent adher-
ence to an accessible cultural script in Chinese contexts (see
Dion, 1996; Kirmayer, 1987). In a comparison of Chinese-
and Euro-Canadians, group difference in EOT was medi-
ated by adherence to ‘Western’ values (Dere, Falk, & Ryder,
2012). People vary in accessibility of cultural scripts about
emotional expression, and cultural contexts vary in terms
of how normal these scripts are perceived to be. Mr. Cho
had access to multiple scripts but the Chinese somatic script
predominated – he emphasized somatic symptoms while in-
creasingly considering psychological symptoms, and tended
to see the latter as consequences of somatic symptoms.
Emotional Expression
Studies comparing depressed Euro-Americans and Asian-
Americans to their non-depressed counterparts show that
depression is associated with culturally-specific patterns of
emotional reactivity. For Euro-Americans, depression is
characterized by dampened emotional reactivity in response
to positive and negative emotional films (see Bylsma, Mor-
ris, & Rottenberg, 2008). Chentsova-Dutton et al. (2007)
replicated this pattern with negative films in Euro-Americans
using self-report, facial coding, and physiological measures,
but failed to find it – and at times, found the inverse –
in Asian-Americans (primarily Chinese-Americans). More
surprisingly, Chentsova-Dutton, Tsai, and Gotlib (2010)
replicated the pattern using positive films, so that on cer-
tain measures such as cardiac reactivity, depressed Asian-
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Americans were actually more reactive than non-depressed
Asian-Americans.
Cultural contexts provide people with shared scripts for
how to feel and express emotions. Failure to enact cul-
turally normative emotional scripts may contribute to de-
pressed mood, and may also be exacerbated by such mood.
The Euro-American pattern of dampened reactivity when de-
pressed may reflect failure to enact accessible cultural scripts
for open and prominently displayed emotional responses
(Bellah, Sullivan, Tipton, Swidler, & Madsen, 1985). The
Chinese-American pattern of heightened reactivity when de-
pressed may reflect failure to enact readily available cul-
tural scripts of moderated experience and expression of one’s
emotions (Russell & Yik, 1996). Exemplifying the latter, Mr.
Cho was at times strikingly expressive discussing difficult
topics despite retrospectively denying depressed mood.
Explanatory Models
It is normative in ‘Western’ cultural settings to not just
emphasize psychological symptoms but also to link distress
to psychological causes. Ban, Kashima, and Haslam (2010)
explored the extent to which behavior is deemed patholog-
ical if it violates this cultural script. A vignette describ-
ing someone with depression, including or not including a
psychological cause, was presented to Euro-Australian and
Chinese-Singaporean university students. Euro-Australian
students were more likely to perceive depression as ‘nor-
mal’ when their vignette included a psychological explana-
tion. For Chinese-Singaporean students, psychological ex-
planations made the depression seem less normal, and they
preferred moral to psychological explanations on a question-
naire.
For Euro-Australians, living in a cultural context with a
readily accessible script equating abnormality with irrational
psychological functioning, psychological explanations help
restore a sense of order. Chinese-Singaporeans, by con-
trast, live in a cultural context where the predominant script
equates emotional maturity with adjustment of behavior to
situational demands (Kirmayer, 2007). Indeed, Chinese-
Singaporean moral explanations centered on failed social
obligations. These modes of explanation represent scripts
that are available, to varying extents, in different cultural
contexts. Mr. Cho initially presented along the lines of a
medicalizing script, which soon gave way to a moralizing
script about failing his family. Eventually, he was willing to
consider a psychologizing script without fully endorsing it.
Reinterpreting the Research
How can we understand these findings in light of cul-
ture–mind–brain? Before depression emerges, people have
access to culturally shaped scripts about what depression is
and assume others have access to these scripts as well (Ban
et al., 2010). Once depression emerges, its implications cas-
cade rapidly through all levels of culture–mind–brain, moti-
vating people to make sense of what is happening to them
(Philippot & Rimé, 1997). Scripts focus attention on cer-
tain symptoms, magnifying some experiences and minimiz-
ing others. A looping effect takes place – experiences that
best draw upon the cultural symptom pool in ways that fit
available scripts about depression are focused upon, further
contributing to their severity (Shorter, 1992). Multiple cul-
tural scripts can coexist and draw upon this pool, so that
patients in a single cultural context can nonetheless present
many different kinds of symptoms (Ryder et al., 2008).
In keeping with the idea of mind as social, we have real
and imagined audiences for this process: what do we tell
other people; what are they going to notice; how are they
going to react? (Chiu et al., 2010) These others are specific
others, with their own experiences, relationships with the suf-
ferer, social roles, and functions within societal institutions.
The real and imagined presence of specific others shapes the
explanations chosen, the emotions expressed, and the symp-
toms emphasized (Chentsova-Dutton & Tsai, 2010; Jakobs,
Manstead, & Fisher, 1996; Lam, Marra, & Salzinger, 2005;
Matsumoto, Takeuchi, Andayani, Kouznetsova, & Krupp,
1998). Sufferers generate additional stressors as others react
to evident and unusual signs. It is not simply that depres-
sion is associated with non-normal emotional expressions
(Chentsova-Dutton et al., 2007, 2010), but that another loop
is generated where reactions of others to these expressions
lead to censure and withdrawal, hence to rejection and fur-
ther depression.
As per the cultural dynamical approach (Kashima, 2000),
we should expect actual experiences of depression – what
is experienced, expressed, talked about, witnessed, shared
with mental health professionals, discussed in the local com-
munity – to shape cultural scripts pertaining to depression.
There is emerging evidence in China that rapid social change
is shifting public understanding of depression, altering cul-
tural scripts, and in turn shaping symptoms presented by suc-
cessive cohorts. In consequence, exposure to modernization
and Westernization values is lessening the tendency for Chi-
nese patients to emphasize somatic symptoms of depression
(Ryder et al., 2011).
Contributions and Limitations
These studies represent three independent attempts to
bring together cultural and clinical psychology to investi-
gate a particular clinical phenomenon in a particular cultural
group, drawing on both fields for theory, methodology, and
interpretation. These studies go beyond cataloguing group
differences, examining how various aspects of Chinese – and
‘Western’ – cultural contexts, including scripts, values, cog-
nitive styles, norms, and attributions, shape depression. They
are methodologically varied, including self-report question-
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naires but also interviews, open-ended response coding, psy-
chophysiology, facial coding, vignettes, mediation analysis,
and experimental designs.
Our studies have limitations, notably including failures
to adhere to some of the recommendations summarized in
the Appendix. Cultural and diagnostic groups, for example,
could be more clearly defined. The studies are compatible
with a dynamic view of culture but do not go very far in
advancing that agenda. Culture is not assessed in a multi-
method way. More fundamentally, however, what is miss-
ing so far is the brain, and thus the potential synthesis im-
plied by culture–mind–brain. Somatic and emotional expe-
riences are connected in the brain (Craig, 2008) and may be
emphasized or deemphasized in the mind based on cultural
scripts (Wiens, 2005). Kim, Sherman, Sasaki, et al. (2010b)
have shown that variations in oxytocin receptor genes inter-
act with cultural context and level of subjective distress to
predict help-seeking, a rare example of how levels of cul-
ture–mind–brain can be included in a single study.
Even with improvements in conception, sampling, meth-
ods, and interpretation, we do not expect that any given study,
or even research program, would cover everything discussed
here. Cultural–clinical psychology already exists in a sense,
including researchers who have been making important con-
tributions for years. At the same time, there is as yet lit-
tle sense of a shared enterprise, let alone of the institutional
markers of such. What is needed is a greater degree of co-
herence and integration, where individual research groups
approach different pieces of the overall puzzle, but with a
shared framework and an ongoing commitment to putting
this puzzle together.
Conclusion
There is much to be gained from greater connection
between cultural and clinical psychology, with a core of
researchers at the intersection. Cultural psychology can
benefit from testing the limits of cultural influence across
the full range of psychological functioning, including psy-
chopathological extremes and difficult environmental condi-
tions. Likewise, clinical psychology can consider a wider
range of sociocultural phenomena that may affect mental
illness. The two fields together point to a dynamic model
of culture–mind–brain that can serve as a central pillar of
this interdisciplinary field. Cultural–clinical psychology ad-
vances attempts to conceptualize mental health phenom-
ena as dynamic and context-dependent, rather than fully re-
ducible to physiological deficits or environmental stressors.
We emphasize ‘cultural’ aspects because we believe that ex-
planations at this level are often neglected in mental health
research, but hope that ultimately no discussion of mental
health will seem complete without consideration of all levels.
The case of Mr. Cho illustrates how knowledge of cultural
context and its accessible symptom scripts help us to bet-
ter assess clients and modify treatment approaches to better
adapt to these scripts. We observe how the clinical encounter
becomes a space in which cultural scripts are negotiated, in-
fluencing both participants and shifting over the course of
treatment. Training programs, internship sites, and licensing
bodies increasingly insist on training in diversity and cultural
competence without a clear vision of how to proceed or what
evidence to use. Cultural competence is more than simply
using good clinical skills with ethnic minority patients; cul-
tural–clinical psychology can aspire to provide an evidence
base (Ryder & Dere, 2010). At the same time, cultural com-
petence includes questioning that evidence, considering dan-
gers of reducing people to cultural categories (Kleinman &
Benson, 2006). As we conclude our case history, we catch
a glimpse of how seeing a patient’s symptoms only through
the lens of cultural explanations can yield surprises.
By the end of treatment, Mr. Cho was still struggling but
wanted to try implementing some changes by himself. He
continued to prioritize somatic symptoms, but agreed that
psychological symptoms were part of his experience. At
six-month follow-up, Mr. Cho reported ongoing appetite
and gastrointestinal problems, but much better sleep, energy
level, and mood. He mentioned that he was now working
with a specialist, who was finding that the ongoing gastroin-
testinal and appetite problems might be related to a specific
medical issue. The possibility of this separate issue may have
been lost in the context of the other symptoms.
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Appendix: Practical Recommendations for conducting
Cultural-Clinical Psychology Research
1. Defining Cultural and Diagnostic Categories
When we use categories, we have a tendency to assume
that these categories are clearly separated from one another
and capture fundamental differences. We essentialize groups
when we assume that all people from a certain cultural back-
ground or carrying a certain diagnosis are the same as one an-
other, and different from people in other groups. At the same
time, however, it is very difficult to conduct research with-
out relying on groupings of individual people. Researchers
should therefore adopt a pragmatic rather than essentialized
approach to describing cultural groups and diagnostic cate-
gories:
1.1 For cultural groups, specify on a study-by-study basis
how each group is defined and for what purposes, and inter-
pret results in light of a more nuanced and dynamic view of
culture. Doing so not only means more accurate reporting
of methods, but also serves as a reminder that group mem-
bership is not self-evident, especially around the edges of a
given category.
1.2 For diagnostic categories, consider a ‘lumping’ approach
for syndromes and a ‘splitting’ approach for symptoms –
very few broad categories for communication and compari-
son purposes (e.g., emotional disorders, psychotic disorders)
followed by a fine-grained approach to individual symptoms.
We might define the problem being compared across groups
very broadly – for example, how do people in different con-
text cope with loss? – and then seek to answer that question
in part by looking at differences in how individual symptoms
are presented.
2. Understanding and Measuring Culture
Culture is complex, deeply interconnected with all aspects
of human life, often implicit, rarely straightforward, and can
shape different people in different ways. It is therefore dif-
ficult to study, and it is hard to conduct good research with-
out already knowing a lot about the context being studied
– much as mainstream psychology researchers have a lot of
tacit and unexamined knowledge about their own contexts.
Researchers should therefore know the cultural context well,
aided by personal immersion in the context, selected cultural
informants, and⁄or multicultural research teams:
2.1 Tell a cultural story about the phenomena under study,
aiming to explain ways in which culture shapes mental health
rather than cataloguing group differences. At the start of a
line of inquiry, that should involve using knowledge of the
cultural context to propose potential explanations. Later on,
studies should incorporate these potential explanations into
the research design; for example, by testing the extent to
which they can mediate group difference effects, or by ma-
nipulating them experimentally.
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2.2 Pay attention to and assess contradictory cultural scripts,
rather than assuming that cultural contexts foster a single
script for a particular domain. Doing so helps move away
from cultural determinism and helps counteract the tendency
to essentialize culture, serving as a reminder that culture is
complex and can influence different people in different ways.
2.3 Aim to measure culture in a multi-method way, as it
exists in the head (e.g., via self-report or implicit cognitive
tasks) and in the world (e.g., via behavioral observation or
examination of cultural products). While not always possi-
ble within a single study, use of different methods strength-
ens a line of research and captures some of the complexity of
culture. Indeed, it is not always the case that these different
methods will agree; points of contradiction may be impor-
tant.
3. Situating Research within the Culture-Mind-Brain
System
Situating research within the culture-mind-brain system. We
have described culture, mind, and brain as a deeply interac-
tive and non-reductive multilevel system. It is not possible
to capture such a system within a single study, or even in
a line of research. What is possible, however, is to focus
on aspects that are important to the research question and
compatible with one’s training and resources. These aspects
should be identified and studied carefully while we remain
mindful that our work is embedded within a broader system.
Researchers should therefore remember that a complex and
dynamic system requires one to enter at a certain point, cho-
sen for reasons of practicality or training:
3.1 Use culture–mind–brain as the overarching framework,
clearly delineating a certain part of the system within a
study for pragmatic research purposes. A more narrowly-
defined study (e.g., described by the methods and results)
can be framed within a broader conceptual argument (e.g.,
described by the introduction and discussion). A series of
more specific empirical papers can be supported by a more
general theoretical review.
3.2 Given that one is focusing on part of the system, frame
causal arguments as proximal rather than ultimate. It is un-
likely that one has identified a causal explanation for any-
thing that itself has no need of explanation. This does not
take away from the possibility that we might have identified
a crucial link in the causal chain, or the importance of doing
so.
